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A RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA: THE
CASE FOR FEDERAL COMMON LAW
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) l provides for the abatement
and clean up of hazardous waste releases by imposing strict liability
on parties responsible for these releases. In addition, CERCLA cre-
ates a trust fund to finance cleanups when the government cannot
locate responsible parties. Although early drafts of CERCLA con-
tained express provisions imposing joint and several liability and al-
lowing contribution among defendants, CERCLA's sponsors
deleted these provisions as part of a compromise measure to ensure
the bill's passage. Despite the deletion of the joint and several lia-
bility provision, courts have applied ajoint and several liability stan-
dard to multi-defendant CERCLA cases by looking to federal
common law principles.
This Note analyzes whether, in light ofjudicial creation and im-
position of a federal common law rule ofjoint and several liability, a
right of contribution among defendants should also be available
under CERCLA. Contribution among defendants is an important
component of a joint and several liability scheme because it ensures
that responsible parties other than those actually held jointly and
severally liable share the burden of liability. Section I of this Note
discusses the statute and the history ofjoint and several liability and
contribution under CERCLA. Section II considers and rejects the
argument that notwithstanding the deletion of the contribution pro-
vision, Congress created a right of contribution under CERCLA
either expressly or by dear implication. Section III analyzes
whether courts should fill the gaps in CERCLA's liability provisions
with federal common law. This Note argues that despite judicial
hostility toward creating special federal common law, the gaps in
CERCLA's liability provisions and the strong federal policy of abat-
ing hazardous waste releases require the courts to fill the gaps in
CERCLA's liability allocation scheme with a federal common law
right of contribution. This Note also concludes that CERCLA's leg-
islative history and statutory scheme indicate that Congress empow-
ered federal courts to fashion a federal common law right of
contribution.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
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I
AN OVERVIEW OF LIABILrTY UNDER CERCLA
A. The Statute
CERCLA provides for emergency response, liability for the
costs of cleanup, and compensation in the event of a release of a
hazardous substance. 2 CERCLA also provides for the cleanup of in-
active and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites.3 The Act be-
stows broad authority on the President to take remedial and
abatement action when the actual or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance presents an imminent and substantial threat to public
health or welfare.4 CERCLA also establishes a Hazardous Sub-
stances Response Fund (the "Superfund") 5 of $1.6 billion raised'
through general revenues and a tax on the oil and chemical indus-
tries. 6 The Superfund reimburses government or private parties for
the costs of hazardous waste site cleanup when the government can-
not locate the responsible parties or the responsible parties fail to
begin their own cleanup actions.7
Under CERCLA, persons responsible for the release or
threatened release of hazardous wastes are strictly liable8 for
2 Id. §§ 9604, 9606 & 9607.
3 Id. "Response" under CERCLA includes actions such as storage, confinement,
dredging or excavations, and repair or replacement of leaking containers. Id.
§ 9601(23)-(25).
4 Id. § 9604.
5 Id. § 9631(a), (c).
6 Taxes on oil and certain chemicals constitute 87.5%o of the $1.6 billion
Superfund. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611(a)-(b), 4661(a)-(b) (1982). General revenues make up
the remaining 12.5%b. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b).
CERCLA's taxing mechanism, which finances the Superfund, expired on September
30, 1985. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d). Despite several attempts, Congress did not pass a
reauthorization bill during the 1984 session. In the 1985 session, however, the Senate
has passed a $7.5 billion, five-year reauthorization bill, S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. REC. S12034 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1985). The bill would raise $5.4 billion from a
new tax on manufacturers and raw material producers with sales of more than $5 million
a year. 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEV. (BNA) 892 (Sept. 20, 1985).
The House has not yet passed a $10 billion, five-year reauthorization bill, H.R.
2817. On October 23, 1985, the House Ways and Means Committee approved the bill
which includes a waste-end tax on disposal facilities and an excise tax on manufacturers
and importers. 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEv. (BNA) 1075 (Oct. 25, 1985). If H.R. 2817
does not reach the House floor by Thanksgiving, the House-Senate conference commit-
tee probably will not consider it before Christmas, and reauthorization will be delayed
until 1986. 16 ENV'T REP. CURRENT DEV. (BNA) 1251 (Nov. 15, 1985).
7 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (1982).
8 CERCLA's liability is defined as strict by reference to § 311 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(c) (1982), a provision for
recovery of cleanup costs for spills into navigable waters. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Courts
have interpreted § 311 as imposing a strict liability standard. United States v. Tex-Tow,
Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d
1305 (7th Cir. 1978). By referring to § 311, CERCLA's drafters intended "liability" to
trigger a strict liability standard. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement by Sen.
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cleanup costs and damage to natural resources. 9 The strict liability
provisions embrace four categories of parties: (1) persons presently
owning or operating a polluting facility, (2) persons owning or oper-
ating a polluting facility at the time of disposal, (3) persons arrang-
ing for disposal, treatment, or transport of wastes (including waste
generators), and (4) persons accepting wastes for transport to dis-
posal or treatment facilities.10 A defendant faced with a CERCLA
claim may escape liability only if he proves that an act of God, an act
Randolph: "We have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the standard of
liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act [FWPCA] . . . . I understand this to
be a standard of strict liability. . . . As under section 311, due care or the absence of
negligence with respect to a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance does
not constitute a defense under this act."). See also 126 CONG. REc. 31,966 (1980) (letter
from Assistant Attorney General Alan A. Parker to Rep. Florio and remarks of Rep.
Florio).
Finally, every district court addressing the issue has held that CERCLA's liability
section imposes strict liability. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983).
See also United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvT. L. INST.) 20,385, 20,386-
87 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) (only § 107(a), and not § 106(a), permits joint and several
liability); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 ENvrL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,272, 20,274 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984) (CERCLA § 107(a) holds de-
fendants strictly liable); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (citing United States v. Price for proposition that "past off-site generators
should be held to a standard of strict liability"); United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (standard of strict
liability applies equally to §§ 106(a), 104, and 107(a) of CERCLA); United States v. A&F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1254-55 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (strict liability is intended
standard under CERCLA; Congress did not preclude imposition of joint and several
liability).
9 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) & (C) (1982).
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of CERCLA gives that
agency two enforcement options. Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging
Law of Generator Liability, 14 ENvmL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 10,224, 10,225 (1984). The
EPA may seek either monetary relief in cost recovery actions authorized by § 107, 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (1982), or may seek injunctive relief in abatement actions authorized by
§ 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). Comment, supra, at 10,225. States and any other party
incurring cleanup costs may also seek reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B).
10 42 U.S.C.§ 9607 (a) (1982). Subsection (a) of § 9607 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or oper-
ated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
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of war, or an act of a third party caused the damage. 1
B. Joint and Several Liability
Although CERCLA holds responsible parties strictly liable, the
statute fails to prescribe a method for allocating that liability when
multiple parties bear responsibility for a hazardous release. CER-
CLA's drafters originally provided for joint and several liability cou-
pled with a right of contribution, but omitted both provisions from
the final bill in order to appease opponents of the legislation who
viewed the provisions as "grossly unfair."' 12 In enforcement actions
to date, the executive branch has repeatedly called for joint and sev-
eral liability under CERCLA, 13 while the chemical industry has ar-
gued for apportioned liability.' 4 The government has consistently
prevailed in the district courts.' 5 Thus, the judiciary has applied
joint and several liability to CERCLA cases, notwithstanding Con-
gress's deliberate deletion of such a provision; it has not, however,
decided whether CERCLA permits contribution among jointly and
severally liable defendants. An examination of the legislative his-
tory of CERCLA's liability provisions and of the district court deci-
sions on joint and several liability lays the groundwork for analyzing
the contribution question.
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall
be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, de-
struction, or loss resulting from such a release.
Id. § 9607(a).
I I ii. § 9607(b). The definition of third party excludes agents, employees, and
those individuals in a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the defendant. Id.
§ 9607(b)(3). Also, the defendant must show that he exercised due care and took pre-
cautions against any foreseeable third party acts. Id.
12 See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
14 Apportioned liability in this context means that the government would bear the
burden of proving the contribution of each defendant and would pay any share of the
costs it could not allocate. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965). In con-
trast, if liability is joint and several, both the burden of proof of allocation and the risk
that not all costs can be allocated fall on the defendants (assuming the government can
identify responsible parties that are financially solvent). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 433A, 875, 881 (1979); Comment, supra note 9, at 10,231. For text of
§§ 433A, 875, and 881, see infra note 34.
15 See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text (reviewing trial court treatment).
No appellate court has directly confronted the question. But see New York v. Shore Re-
alty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985) (dicta suggesting application of
joint and several liability to CERCLA claim).
1986]
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1. Legislative History
CERCLA resulted from a compromise measure drafted in the
Senate at the end of the ninety-sixth Congress. 16 The Act devel-
oped primarily from two bills, H.R. 7020 and S. 1480,17 which ex-
plicitly provided for the imposition of strict liability on a joint and
several basis and for contribution.1 s To ensure passage of hazard-
ous waste legislation before the end of the 1980 session, the bills'
sponsors produced a compromise 19 that deleted provisions impos-
ing joint and several liability and a right of contribution. 20 The de-
letions satisfied the bills' opponents by eliminating the harsh result
of holding each defendant potentially liable for the entire cleanup
cost if other defendants were insolvent.21
The floor debates constitute the only legislative history ad-
dressing the compromise bill as a whole. Portions of the commen-
tary suggest that the elimination of the joint and several liability
language did not necessarily intend to preclude courts from impos-
16 For a thorough examination of CERCLA's legislative history, see Grad, A Legisla-
tive History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). For a compilation of bills,
hearings, and debates on CERCLA, see ENmrL. L. INST., SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATrVE His-
TORY (1982).
17 H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 7490 (1980), reprinted in 3
ENVrL. L. INST., supra note 16, at 163 (1982); S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. 17,988 (1979). A third bill, H.R. 85, was also proposed but was not the focus of
attention in the final floor debates pertaining to the compromise. H.R. 85, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1979).
18 H.R. 7020, supra note 17, § 307(a); S. 1480, supra note 17, § 4(f).
19 According to Senator Stafford, the compromise proposal was a "combination of
the best of the three other bills, and an elimination of the worst, or at least the most
controversial. Frankly, it eliminate[d] 75 percent of what we were seeking in S. 1480.
But knowing of the urgent need for legislation, we were willing to do that." 126 CONG.
REc. 30,935 (1980).
For statements by opponents of the liability section, see H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Dannemeyer), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119, 6141-42; 126 CONG. REC. 30,972 (1980) (remarks of Sen.
Helms calling imposition of joint and several liability coupled with industry-financed
fund "grossly unfair").
The compromise also deleted a federal cause of action for medical expenses and
personal loss, reduced the size of the Superfund, and altered industry and government
contributions to the Superfund. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,935 (1980) (remarks of Sen.
Stafford).
20 S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(f), 126 CONG. REC. 30,909 (1980). The section
stipulated that "[in any action brought under this section or section 6(c) [imposingjoint
and several liability for damages and removal costs] of this Act, a person held jointly and
severally liable with one or more other persons is entitled to seek contribution from
such persons to the extent of the proportionate liability of such persons." Id.
21 Objecting to the joint and several liability provision in S. 1480, Senator Helms
said it "received intense and well-deserved criticism from a number of sources, since it
could impose financial responsibility for massive costs and damages awards on persons
who contributed only minimally (if at all) to a release or injury." 126 CONG. REC. 30,972
(1980).
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ingjoint and several liability on multiple defendants. For example,
Senator Randolph, sponsor of the compromise proposal, stated:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of com-
mon law. An example is joint and several liability. Any reference
to these terms has been deleted, and the liability of joint tort-
feasors will be determined under common or previous statutory
law. 22
Representative Florio, House sponsor of the compromise bill, em-
phasized the use of federal common law:
[T]his bill refers to section 311 of the [Federal Water Pollution
Control Act] and to traditional and evolving principles of com-
mon law in determining the liability of such joint tortfeasors. To
insure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discour-
age business dealing in hazardous substances from locating pri-
marily in States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the
further development of a Federal common law in this area.23
On the other hand, Senator Helms, an opponent of the legislation,
stated that the compromise bill clearly foreclosed joint and several
liability. According to Helms, eliminating the joint and several lia-
bility provision limited defendants' liability to only "those costs and
damages that [the government] can prove were caused by the de-
fendant's conduct."'24 Thus, the legislative history does not defini-
tively indicate whether, by deleting joint and several liability from
CERCLA, Congress actually intended to foreclose its application to
cases arising under that statute.
2. District Court Decisions
The absence of a specific provision allocating liability among
multiple tortfeasors, and the resulting disagreement among mem-
bers of Congress over the proper interpretation of the compromise
draft, have left the responsibility for allocating liability in a CERCLA
22 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
23 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio). Representative Florio's
remarks indicate that Senator Randolph's reference to "previous statutory law," supra
note 22, means § 311 of the FWPCA. The court in United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844-45 (W.D. Mo. 1984), interpreted the
phrase "previous statutory law" to refer to § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA).
Courts have interpreted § 311 of the FWPCA as imposing strict liability, see supra
note 18, and as allowing the imposition ofjoint and several liability in situations involv-
ing multiple defendants. United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 439 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 557 F.
Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Curtis Bay court also noted that a defendant that
pays for more of its fair share of damages is entitled to contribution from other defend-
ants. Id.
24 126 CONG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
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enforcement action to the courts. District courts confronting liabil-
ity allocation in CERCLA section 107 cost recovery actions have
uniformly imposed joint and several liability if the defendants have
caused an indivisible harm.2 5 The courts have examined GERCLA's
legislative history and concluded that by deleting the joint and sev-
eral language, Congress intended the courts to apply flexible com-
mon law principles of liability allocation to CERCLA rather than a
rigid, legislative mandate that joint and several liability apply in
every case.26 The courts have further reasoned that federal com-
25 United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENv-rL. L. INST.) 20,385 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 5, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 20,272 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceu-
tical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A&F Materials
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In
each of these cases the court imposed the joint and several liability standard advocated
by the government. For a discussion of the liability allocation rule chosen by the courts,
see infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
Several courts have extended the joint and several liability standard they found in
§ 107 of CERCLA to abatement actions under § 106. See supra note 19. Price, 577 F.
Supp at 1113; Conservation Chem., 14 ENv'rL. L. REP. at 20,209; Northeastern Pharmaceutical,
579 F. Supp. at 844-45. One recent decision, United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENV'T L. INST.) 20,385, 20,387 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984), has not followed the other
decisions. String/ellow held that § 106 provides equitable remedies distinct from the legal
remedies of § 107 and that, as a result, § 106(a) does not impose joint and several liabil-
ity to abate hazardous substance pollution. According to the court, applying joint and
several liability to § 106 actions would give the EPA an alternative way to collect dam-
ages which would be inappropriate for an equitable remedy. Id.
26 E.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (W.D. Mo.
1984). These courts have followed the reasoning of Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at
802. See Conservation Chem., 589 F. Supp. at 62-63 (quoting Chem-Dyne). In Chem-Dyne the
court examined CERCLA's legislative history to determine congressional intent with re-
gard to the liability allocation issue. The court looked to the commentary of Congress-
men Stafford, Randolph, and Florio (sponsors of the bill), see supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text, and explained that although the remarks of a single legislator do not
control, the statements of the legislation's sponsors deserve substantial consideration
when interpreting the statute. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 807 (citing Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979)). Assessing the commentary, the court con-
cluded that "a reading of the entire legislative history in context reveals that the scope of
liability and term joint and several liability were deleted to avoid a mandatory legislative
standard applicable in all situations which might produce inequitable results in some
cases." Id. at 808. The court continued, "[T]he term was omitted in order to have the
scope of liability determined under common law principles." Id.
Critics of the Chem-Dyne decision argue that the court gave the floor statements of
sponsors Randolph, Stafford, and Florio more weight than they deserved. Price, Divid-
ing the Costs of Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups Under Superfund: Is Joint and Several Liability
Appropriate?, 52 UMKC L. REV. 339, 354-55 (1984). These critics argue that because the
bill's sponsors could not secure passage of the bill without deleting joint and several
liability terms, their statements were not entitled to the substantial consideration the
Chem-Dyne court accorded them. Id. at 355. These critics further contend that the re-
marks of CERCLA opponents, such as Senator Helms, should receive greater weight
than those of the bill's supporters because, as opponents, their "position represents the
filter through which the final bill had to flow in order to pass." Id. at 346.
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mon law should provide the liability allocation rule because the haz-
ardous waste problem and CERCLA's corrective program have
national scope and significance and thus implicate uniquely federal
interests.2 7
The district courts have identified two uniquely federal inter-
ests. First, they have concluded that the improper disposal or re-
lease of hazardous wastes is a complex, national problem.28
Hazardous substances dumped at a waste site typically originate in
several states, and pollution of land and groundwater often crosses
state boundaries.2 9 Second, the courts have reasoned that because
general revenues and excise taxes finance the Superfund, the United
States's ability to protect its financial interest in the trust fund is
directly related to the scope of liability under CERCLA.30
Federal courts seeking to develop a common law of liability al-
location have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts3 t or to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).3 2 Section 875 of
the Restatement imposes joint and several liability when two or more
tortfeasors cause a single and indivisible harm.33 Sections 433A and
881 of the Restatement apportion liability when tortfeasors acting in-
27 Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808-09; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1337-38; South
Carolina Retycling, 14 ENri.. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20,275-76; A&F Materials, 578 F.
Supp. at 1255; Conservation Chem., 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20,209; String/el-
low, 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) at 20,386-87. But see Northeastern Pharmaceutical,
579 F. Supp. at 843-45 (refraining from deciding whether federal or state law applied to
liability allocation question because both yielded same result in case).
The district courts justified formulating federal common law by resting on the rule
that federal courts may create federal common law to protect uniquely federal interests.
E.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808-09. See also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials,
451 U.S. 630, 640-42 (1981) (federal courts may fashion federal common law to further
uniquely federal interests); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981) (same). See also infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing fourth type of
case in which federal courts may generate federal common law).
28 E.g., Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1338; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808.
29 Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808. The uniquely federal interest implicated by
interstate hazardous waste pollution resembles the strong federal concern over inter-
state water pollution discussed in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Mil-
waukee I). See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text (discussing filling CERCLA's
gaps with federal common law right of contribution based on Milwaukee I rationale).
30 Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808; String/ellow, 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L.
INST.) at 20,387; see also A&F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1255 (recognizing federal govern-
ment's interest in preserving stability of Superfund). Some district courts cited
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943), and held that the United
States's financial interest in the trust fund is a right, obligation, and responsibility that
justifies the development of special federal common law. See infra note 99 and accompa-
nying text.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 875, 881 (1976).
32 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. 1983).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1976). The Restatement recognizes a
right of contribution among tortfeasors held jointly and severally liable. Under § 886A
two or more tortfeasors liable to the same person for the same harm have a right of
contribution among themselves. Id. § 886A.
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dependently cause distinct harms or a single harm involving some
reasonable basis for division according to each tortfeasor's activ-
ity.34 Alternatively, courts have interpreted section 311 of the
FWPCA as allowing joint and several liability and have applied that
liability standard to CERCLA. 35 According to the courts, the de-
fendant bears the burden of proving that an injury is divisible and
consequently that liability is apportionable. 36
II
THE POSSIBILrr THAT CONGRESS CREATED A FEDERAL
RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG CERCLA
DEFENDANTS
In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.37 and Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,38 the Supreme Court held
that "a right to contribution may arise [under federal law] in either
of two ways: first, through the affirmative creation of a right of ac-
tion by Congress, either expressly or by clear implication; or, sec-
ond, through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal
common law of contribution. ' 39 The possibility exists that despite
the deletion of a specific provision granting a right of contribution,
Congress still expressly or impliedly created a statutory right of con-
tribution for CERCLA defendants.
34 Section 433A states in part:
Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm.
Id. § 433A.
Section 881 states:
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously, cause distinct
harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division
according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for
the portion of the total harm that he has himself caused.
Id. § 881.
No right of contribution is available for tortfeasors who are liable only for the por-
tion of the harm that they caused. Id. § 886A.
35 M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d at 438-39; United States v. Bear Marine Servs., 509 F.
Supp. 710, 718-19 (E.D. La. 1980); see also Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at
844-45 (joint and several liability existed on FWPCA and state common law grounds).
36 E.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810 (relying on § 433B of Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts for burden of proof rule).
37 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
38 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
39 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 638 (citing Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90-91).
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A. Express Creation of a Statutory Right of Contribution
Section 107(e)(2) of CERCLA,40 pertaining to cost recovery ac-
tions, arguably suggests that Congress expressly adopted a right of
contribution under CERCLA. Section 107(e) (2) provides, "Nothing
in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this
subsection, shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or
any other person subject to liability under this section, or a guaran-
tor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise
against any person." 4' TheJustice Department has argued that sec-
tion 107(e)(2) creates a right of contribution among parties liable
under section 107.42
The district court in Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. 43 has
agreed with the Justice Department's position. The court inter-
preted the deletion of the Gore Amendment,44 which provided for a
right of contribution, and Congress's substitution of § 107(e)(2), as
showing Representative Gore's intention that the right of contribu-
tion be embodied in § 107(e)(2).45
The conclusions of both the Justice Department and the Wehner
court are incorrect. Section 107(e)(2) is a savings clause preserving
any cause of action that a liable party has against any person.46 As a
savings clause, section 107(e)(2) cannot create a right of contribu-
tion. Indeed, it may only preserve a right of contribution created
elsewhere.
The Wehner court's argument-that the Gore Amendment's
right of contribution is embodied in section 107(e)(2)-is also
flawed. The rejection of the Gore Amendment indicates only that
the House did not favor an express right of contribution. The addi-
tion of a savings clause, § 107(e)(2), does not establish a right of
contribution. Moreover, Senate bill S. 1480, which contained the
contribution provision, also contained language similar to that in
section 107(e)(2). 47 Congress's deliberate deletion of an explicit
contribution provision suggests that it did not intend section 107 to
provide a right of contribution. Had Congress wanted a statutory
40 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982).
41 Id.
42 The Department has maintained that "[tihis provision ... confirms that a de-
fendant held liable for response costs has the right to seek contribution from any other
person responsible for a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance." 126
CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980) (statement submitted on Department's behalf by Rep.
Florio).
43 613 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
44 126 CONG. REC. 26,785 (1980).
45 613 F. Supp. at 1565.
46 See Price, 577 F. Supp. at 343 (arguing that § 107(e)(2) preserves existing claims
and right of contribution if found elsewhere in statute).
47 S. 1480, supra note 17, § 4(n)(5).
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right of contribution, it presumably would have kept the contribu-
tion provision rather than inconspicuously tucked a contribution
right into section 107(e)(2).
Alternatively, some have argued that section 107(a)(4)(B) 48 au-
thorizes potentially liable persons who pursue their own cleanup op-
eration to recover cleanup costs from other responsible parties. In
City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co. 49 a district court held that
because the subsection deems CERCLA defendants liable for "any
other. . . costs of response incurred by any other person," 50 Phila-
delphia could recover cleanup costs from other responsible parties,
despite the city's ownership of the waste site and potential liability
to federal or state governments if those authorities had commenced
cleanup. 51 The court construed section 107(a) to establish three cat-
egories of "persons" entitled to recover cleanup costs from respon-
sible parties: the federal government, the state governments, and
"any other person." 52 According to the court, because CERCLA's
definition of "person" includes federal and state governments, the
term "any other person" refers to persons other than federal or
state governments rather than persons other than those made re-
sponsible under the act.53 Thus, the court in effect found a right of
contribution by viewing section 107(a) (4)(B) to give "a private party
the right to recover response costs from responsible third
parties."5 4
Finding a right of contribution in section 107(a)(4)(B), how-
ever, overextends the intended impact of the section. Section
107(a)(4)(B) may allow persons who lack responsibility for illegal
waste dumping, but who nonetheless are potentially liable as site
owners or operators, to recover cleanup costs from parties responsi-
ble for the dumping. The section does not, however, authorize con-
tribution among parties held liable for cleanup costs. The original
Senate bill 55 contained language similar to section 107(a) (4) (B), in
addition to a separate provision for contribution. Congress's dele-
tion of the contribution provision counters any suggestion that it
intended a contribution right in the text of subsection (B). Thus,
neither section 107(e)(2) nor section 107(a)(4)(B) expressly creates
a right of contribution.
48 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982). For complete text of § 107(a)(4), see supra
note 10.
49 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
50 Id. at 1142 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982)).
51 Id. at 1143.
52 Id. at 1142 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982)).
53 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982)).
54 Id. at 1143.
55 S. 1480, supra note 17.
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B. Implied Creation of a Statutory Right of Contribution
Federal courts may create remedies for a federal statute by in-
ferring the remedies from the statutory scheme. 56 Such cases are
rare. 57 The Supreme Court's marked reluctance to infer a private
cause of action under federal regulatory statutes58 stems from sepa-
ration of powers concerns. The Court is hesitant to intrude upon
the legislature's domain by enlarging the remedial provisions of a
statute beyond the scope Congress adopted.59 Nevertheless, in
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries the Supreme Court identified
specific factors indicative of congressional intent to create a statu-
tory right of contribution. 60 These factors are the statutory lan-
guage, the legislative history, the underlying purpose and structure
of the statutory scheme, and the likelihood that Congress intended
to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies. 61 The deter-
56 See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 285 (1963) (discussing implied causes of action in federal statutes not explicitly
providing such relief.
57 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (inferring private cause of
action under § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Securities legislation has been
the largest source of implied rights of action. See Note, supra note 56, at 286 (citing
cases); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (inferring injunctive
remedy from Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 where Act provided only for penalties).
58 See United States v. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no implied private cause
of action for contribution under Sherman and Clayton Acts); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981) (no implied private cause of action to enforce § 10 of Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (no implied private cause of action for contribution
under Title VII and Equal Pay Act); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754
(1981) (no implied private cause of action for back wages under Davis-Bacon Act);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private cause of
action for damages under § 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975) (no implied stockholder's derivative action under Federal Election Cam-
paign Act).
59 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97 ("The authority to construe a statute is funda-
mentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy
which Congress has decided not to adopt").
60 Id. at 91; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639.
61 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639. The Court derived
the four factors for ascertaining congressional intent from a line of cases beginning with
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
In Texas Industries the Court mentioned an additional factor originally found in Cort,
the identity of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. 451 U.S. at 639. The
court did not deem this factor helpful for finding a right of contribution because the
plaintiffs, antitrust wrongdoers, did not belong to the class for whose benefit Congress
enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts; instead they belonged to the class whose activi-
ties Congress intended to regulate. When applied to CERCLA defendants, this addi-
tional factor also does not appear to support inferring a right of contribution. Because
CERCLA defendants, like antitrust defendants, belong to the class whose activities Con-
gress wants to regulate, one doubts that Congress would intend to mitigate the liability
of the wrongdoers. However, although CERCLA defendants are members of the regu-
lated class, liability under CERCLA, unlike liability under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, is strict, and therefore defendants may be nonculpable, nonnegligent parties. In
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mination of whether CERCLA implicitly creates a right of contribu-
tion requires an analysis of these four factors.
Because CERCLA's provisions make no reference to contribu-
tion, 62 the first factor, statutory language63 cannot serve as a basis
for inferring a contribution cause of action. Nor does the second
factor, the legislative history of CERCLA, 64 suggest that Congress
intended to create a statutory, as opposed to a common law, right of
contribution. Rather, congressional commentary on the final com-
promise bill indicates an intent to abdicate the formulation of liabil-
ity to the courts: "issues of liability not resolved by [the] act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common
law." 65 If the Senate had intended to create a statutory right of con-
tribution, it would likely have retained language similar to that
which it used in the original bill.6 6
One commentator has argued that the drafters of CERCLA may
have omitted sections to reach a compromise while hoping that the
courts would infer the omitted provisions. 67 In support of this the-
ory, the commentator notes that despite the congressional omission
of statutory language imposing strict liability, courts have inter-
preted the statute as imposing strict liability. 68 This argument fails
for two reasons. First, the legislative history of the deletion of strict
liability language differs from the history surrounding the deletion
of the contribution provision. Although Congress deleted specific
strict liability language from CERCLA, it added language that
adopts section 311 of the FWPCA as the liability standard for the
statute.69 Courts have consistently construed section 311 as impos-
ing a strict liability standard.70 Congress was aware of the effect of
such a nonpunitive regulatory situation, Congress does not intend to punish past con-
duct but would rather regulate present and future conduct. To allow contribution as a
way of spreading the cost of liability would not conflict with this regulatory intent.
62 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
63 For a critical discussion of the arguments that § 107(e)(2) and § 107(a)(4)(B) au-
thorize a right to contribution, see supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
64 See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
65 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (statement by Sen. Randolph) (see supra text ac-
companying note 22).
66 S 1480, supra note 20, § 4(0; see also supra text immediately following note 47
(arguing that deletion of explicit contribution provision indicates no congressional in-
tent to create statutory right of contribution).
67 Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 COR-
NELL L. REv. 706, 722 n.113 (1983).
68 Id. For further discussion of the courts' imposition of strict liability under CER-
CLA, see Faron & Feldman, Superfund Liability Outline, 3 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE Li-
Ti. REP. 133, 149-51 (1982). See also cases collected supra note 8 (district court
decisions imposing strict liability).
69 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). The courts have consistently interpreted § 311 to impose
strict liability. See supra note 8.
70 See supra note 8.
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adopting section 311: "We have kept strict liability in the compro-
mise, specifying the standard of liability under section 311 of the
Clean Water Act [FWPCA] .... ,,71 In contrast, the congressional
commentary on contribution suggests that rather than creating a
statutory right of contribution, Congress intended that federal
courts remain free to determine when joint and several liability and
contribution should apply.2
Second, the very need for a compromise measure indicates that
the majority of Congress did not want CERCLA to includejoint and
several liability and contribution provisions of broad application. 73
Congress intended that common law principles govern the contribu-
tion issue.
Thus, the first two factors, statutory language and legislative
history, fail to show congressional intent to create a statutory right
of contribution. The Court in Texas Industries indicated that if the
statutory language and legislative history do not evince the requisite
congressional intent, then the implication inquiry should cease.74
This Note nonetheless briefly considers the remaining factors.
The third factor, the purpose and structure of CERCLA, is con-
sistent with a right of contribution. CERCLA has two purposes:
promoting rapid cleanup of hazardous waste sites and encouraging
careful handling of hazardous wastes.7 5 Because contribution would
allow potentially liable parties to recover from other liable parties, it
would encourage parties to pursue voluntary remedial work and
71 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
72 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. The statement by Senator Randolph
addresses "issues of liability not resolved by this act" and gives as an example joint and
several liability and states that the "liability ofjoint tort feasors will be determined under
common or previous statutory law." 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980). Because contribu-
tion is also an issue of liability of joint tortfeasors not resolved by CERCLA, Senator
Randolph's comment seems to refer to the deletion of the contribution provision as well
as the joint and several liability provision. Consequently the comment suggests that as
with joint and several liability, the courts must decide whether a right of contribution
exists under CERCLA.
In two recent cases the Supreme Court cautioned that federal common law does not
provide an automatic right of contribution. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S.
77, 96 (1981). In these cases, the Court refused to infer a federal statutory right or to
create a federal common law right of contribution under the Sherman Act, the Equal Pay
Act, and Title VII. The Court has however, approved a nonstatutory federal right of
contribution among joint tortfeasors in admiralty cases. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). Therefore, if CERCLA defendants have a fed-
eral common law right of contribution, this right must find support in one of several
recognized instances where federal courts possess the power to develop special federal
common law. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
74 Tams Industries, 451 U.S. at 639.
75 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17, 22, reprinted hi 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6119; S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980).
1986]
682 CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 71:668
other forms of settlement, in furtherance of CERCLA's cleanup
goal. 7 6 A right of contribution would also address CERCLA's sec-
ond goal, encouraging careful hazardous waste management, by
spreading cleanup costs among all responsible parties. The prospect
of liability for contribution to other responsible parties would deter
careless handling of wastes by waste generators, transporters, and
operators of waste facilities. 77 Without a CERCLA rule of contribu-
tion, these other parties might escape liability unless the govern-
ment is able to locate and sue them, a difficult and unlikely
undertaking.78
Opponents of contribution under CERCLA counter that contri-
bution would impede the prompt cleanup goal by discouraging set-
tlement. They maintain that contribution would give responsible
parties incentive to litigate and attempt a successful defense of the
action rather than agree to a settlement.79 The prospect of litiga-
tion would involve little risk for responsible parties because in the
event of liability, the responsible parties could still recover contribu-
tion from settling parties. Additionally, parties who settle would not
receive repose because they would still remain liable to other re-
sponsible parties for contribution. 80 The opponents' arguments do
not apply, however, to a contribution rule prohibiting contribution
claims against persons who settle in good faith and reducing a plain-
tiff's claim against other tortfeasors by the amount the settling party
76 For detailed treatment of Superfund settlement agreements, see Note, supra note
67; Rikleen, Negotiating Superfund Settlement Agreements, 10 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 697
(1982-83). In a typical Superfund settlement agreement, generators propose their own
remedial action to clean up a site. The EPA then consents to the settlement by giving an
administrative order, or a court consents by giving ajudicial consent decree. Note, supra
note 67, at 719; Rikleen, supra, at 706. For a discussion of the advantages of settlement
to both sides see id. at 703-05. Stepan Chemical, 544 F. Supp. at 1135, exemplifies how
contribution would encourage voluntary cleanup. In Stepan Chemical the city of Philadel-
phia apparently pursued the cleanup on the assumption that it could recover the costs of
cleanup from the responsible parties.
77 In the antitrust context one court has taken the position that because most large
businesses are risk-averse, the very possibility of imposition of sole liability has a greater
deterrent effect than the imposition of a proportionate share of the liability. Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979). This
argument does not directly apply to CERCLA defendants because the defendants can
vary greatly in size and the cost of hazardous waste site cleanup is potentially immense.
78 Most of the CERCLA § 107 suits that the EPA has brought have involved only a
small number of the known potentially responsible parties. For example, in United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 26, 1982), the govern-
ment sued about 40 companies. About 150 companies, however, escaped suit by agree-
ing to settle with the EPA.
79 Supplemental Memorandum of Certain Settling Third-Party Defendants (filed
Feb. 16, 1984), United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed
Aug. 26, 1982).
80 Id.
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paid in settlement.81 This contribution rule encourages settlement
because a plaintiff knows how much of his claim he is risking by set-
tling with one party and the settler gains protection from the contri-
bution claims of other liable parties.8 2
CERCLA's statutory structure also comports with a right of
contribution. The creation of the Superfund indicates an intent to
spread the costs of hazardous waste cleanup across the chemical in-
dustry rather than to impose costs on a few responsible parties.83 A
right of contribution conforms with this intent by spreading cleanup
costs among all responsible parties. Moreover, contribution is con-
sistent with the underlying regulatory and remedial character of
CERCLA. One might argue that contribution mitigates the liability
of wrongdoing defendants by broadly distributing the judgment
burden among responsible parties. CERCLA defendants, however,
81 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, drafter of
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, has recognized the settlement incen-
tive provided by a contribution rule that bars contribution claims against persons who
settle in good faith, and has fashioned such a rule in § 4 of the UNIFORM CoNrRIBuTIoN
AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1955). Section 4 provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but
it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
82 In proposing the revised § 4 of the Uniform Act in 1955, the drafters explained
that the original 1939 Uniform Act had discouraged settlements because it required a
plaintiff to reduce his claim against other nonsettling joint tortfeasors by the pro-rata
share of the released tortfeasor. 12 U.L.A. 99 (1975). According to the drafters, plain-
tiffs often refused to accept any release containing a provision reducing damages to the
extent of the pro-rata share of the released tortfeasor because the plaintiff would receive
no indication of the pro-rata share size until after the judgment against the other
tortfeasors. The 1939 provision also did not prevent collusion between a plaintiff and a
released tortfeasor against an unreleased tortfeasor. Id.
The 1955 revision of the act cures these problems by barring contribution claims
against persons who settle in good faith and by reducing a plaintiff's claim against other
jointly liable defendants by the settlement amounts. The contribution rule in § 4 thereby
provides to settlers the repose that induces settlement. The requirement that the re-
lease or covenant be given in good faith gives a court the opportunity to determine
whether collusion exists. If it does, the settling party is not discharged from the contri-
bution claims of other parties. Id. In the Chem-Dyne case the United States argued that
the court should adopt § 4 of the Uniform Act as federal common law. Response of the
United States to Motion to Dismiss at 14 (filed Mar. 14, 1984), United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 26, 1982).
83 Response of the United States to Motion to Dismiss at 10 (filed Mar. 14, 1984),
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 26, 1982).
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often include nonnegligent parties held strictly liable.8 4 Therefore,
the concern that contribution would ameliorate the liability of cul-
pable parties does not arise.8 5
The fourth factor, the likelihood that Congress intended to su-
persede or supplement state law, also favors the recognition of a
right of contribution under CERCLA. Contribution among jointly
and severally liable parties is not exclusively relegated to state law; it
exists in federal statutory and common law.86 Because CERCLA lia-
bility is federal in nature, federal law should govern the extent of
liability under the statute and a defendants' ability to seek
contribution.
Uniformity interests also support a federal contribution rule.
Although thirty-nine states have contribution statutes or allow con-
tribution by judicial decision, the timing of the contribution claim
varies. Some states allow contribution claims only after judgment
and payment of a plaintiff's claim.8 7 Other states permit contribu-
tion claims before judgment.88 The effect of a settlement agree-
ment on the contribution claims of nonsettling parties also varies by
state.8 9 A uniform federal rule, however, barring contribution
claims against parties who settle in good faith and requiring a plain-
tiff to reduce his claim against nonsettling parties by the amounts
paid in settlement, is preferable because it would promote settle-
ment and cleanup. 90 Section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act could serve as a source for this federal rule.
Supplementing state contribution schemes with a uniform fed-
eral rule would conform with the CERCLA goal of closing the gap in
federal and state environmental statutes by providing a single sys-
tem for the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites.91 The Love
84 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). For a discussion of parties subject to liability under
CERCLA, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
85 For a discussion of the argument that contribution mitigates the burden of culpa-
ble defendants, see infra note 140.
86 In the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982), Congress fashioned three express provi-
sions for contribution: 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f), 78i(e), and 78r(b). Contribution also occurs
as part of the special federal common law created in admiralty cases. E.g., Cooper Steve-
doring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
87 An example of a post-judgment contribution rule is § 4 of the UNIFORM CoTrRI-
BuTiON AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr, supra note 81.
88 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31 (1978) (example of prejudgment con-
tribution rule).
89 See UNIF. CONrRIBTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955) (barring contribu-
tion claims against parties who settle in good faith); see also supra notes 81-82 and accom-
panying text (discussing § 4 of Uniform Act).
90 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
91 See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980); 126 CONG. REC. H9459-
60 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980). For further discussion of RCRA and the gap CERCLA
filled, see infra note 114.
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Canal incident 92 in Niagara Falls, New York, demonstrated the gross
inadequacy of then existing state and federal legislative schemes.
During the Love Canal incident, imprecise division of administrative
authority obstructed the ability of state and local officials to react to
the improper waste disposal. The EPA and other federal agencies,
unsure of their jurisdictional and financial powers, also failed to re-
spond adequately.93 Because CERCLA purports to address these in-
adequacies, Congress clearly intended it to supplement existing
state laws for hazardous waste cleanup, rather than relegate hazard-
ous waste cleanup solely to state law.
Despite the favorable outcome of the third and fourth factors,
the implication analysis reveals no implied cause of action for con-
tribution under CERCLA. The critical first two factors, statutory
language and legislative history, fail to show congressional intent to
create the statutory right.
III
FEDERAL COMMON LAW RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG
CERCLA DEFENDANTS
Although CERCLA neither explicitly nor implicitly provides for
a right of contribution, courts could still apply contribution to CER-
CLA cases by looking to federal common law. Federal courts lack
the power to create a "federal general common law, '" 94 but they can
generate special federal common law in certain areas. Commenta-
tors95 have divided Supreme Court decisions creating special fed-
eral common law into four categories: (1) filling statutory
interstices, 96 (2) inferring remedies from federal statutes,97 (3) con-
92 See generally S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA
(1982) (discussing details of Love Canal incident and public outcry as to danger of haz-
ardous waste); Report of the New York Office of Public Health, Love Canal: Public Health Time
Bomb (1978) (same).
93 See Tripp, Liability Issues in Litigation Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 52 UMKC L. REV. 364, 365-66 (1984).
94 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
95 C. Wright, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (3d ed. 1976); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 756-832 (2d ed. 1973); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957). See also Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967) (primarily discussing decisions
that infer remedies from statutes or create law in areas of federal interest).
96 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) ("It may happen that
new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal
common law of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered
to appraise the equities of the suits ...."); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (although frequently no specific federal legislation gov-
erns particular transaction to which United States is party, this silence provides no ra-
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struing a jurisdictional grant or a legislative history as an authoriza-
tion to fashion federal common law,98 and (4) spontaneously
generating law in areas of special federal interest.99
The district courts have created a federal common law rule of
joint and several liability on the grounds that both hazardous waste
pollution and CERCLA's corrective scheme involve uniquely federal
interests.100 These decisions fall into the fourth category, areas of
special federal interest. The courts, however, cannot invoke the
same approach when attempting to fashion a common law right of
contribution under CERCLA. As the Court in Texas Industries
pointed out, an action for contribution among private parties does
not trigger federal concerns reaching the high threshold of
" 'uniquely federal interests' . . . that oblige courts to formulate
federal common law." 10 1 The federal government is not a party to a
contribution cause of action under CERCLA. Further, the uniquely
federal interest that courts invoked to impose joint and several lia-
bility, the United States's ability to protect its financial interest in
the Superfund,10 2 would be satisfied once courts impose joint and
several liability. Thus, whether CERCLA defendants have a right of
contribution among themselves is of no direct consequence to the
United States and does not implicate a "uniquely federal interest"
necessary to generate federal common law.
The courts, however, can justify creating a federal common law
right of contribution under CERCLA. First, federal courts could
choose to create a uniform contribution rule to fill the gaps that
Congress left in CERCLA's liability provisions.10 3 Second, federal
courts could interpret CERCLA's legislative history and statutory
scheme as authorizing them to create a federal common law rule.
tionale for limiting reach of federal laws). See generally Mishkin, supra note 95, at 799-800
("[E]ffective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal courts to
declare, as a matter of federal common law or 'judicial legislation,' rules... necessary to
fill in interstitially .... ).
97 See cases collected supra note 57.
98 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (concluding that
congressional intent to give federal courts substantive lawmaking power existed in § 301
of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which granted federal courts jurisdiction
over union contract violation suits).
99 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964) (federal
law governs legal disputes affecting international relations); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (absent congressional legislation, federal
common law governs federal government's disbursement of funds); Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (federal common law
determines whether to apportion water of interstate stream).
100 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
101 Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642.
102 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103 For a detailed explanation of the gaps, see supra notes 16-24 and accompanying
text.
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A. Gap Filling
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1)104 the Supreme Court
discussed gap filling in the context of federal water pollution stat-
utes. In Milwaukee I, the Court recognized a federal common law of
nuisance in certain waters.' 0 5 Illinois brought suit against the city of
Milwaukee to abate a public nuisance caused by the city's disposal of
sewage into Lake Michigan. Even though the statute did not pre-
scribe the remedy that Illinois sought, the Court maintained that
"the remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only
federal remedies available."' 06 According to the Court, federal
courts could create federal common law to abate nuisances in inter-
state waters. 10 7
The Court based its decision on the competence of and need
for the federal courts to fill gaps Congress left in the FWPCA and
other federal water pollution statutes. The Court emphasized the
strong federal concern for abating water pollution, a policy evi-
denced by the FWPCA and other federal statutes.'0 8 In addition,
the Court noted its past practice of fashioning federal common law
in areas in which an overriding federal interest triggered a need for
a uniform rule of decision or in which the controversy touched basic
interests of federalism.' 0 9 The Court, however, cautioned that "new
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the
field of federal common law of nuisance," although no preemption
had yet occurred.10 Thus, in Milwaukee I, the Court applied federal
104 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Mil-
waukee II) (subsequent to Milwaukee I, Congress filled gaps of FWPCA by amendment).
105 The Milwaukee 11 Court summarized the background of the dispute:
Illinois' claim was first brought to this Court when Illinois sought
leave to file a complaint under our original jurisdiction. [In Milwaukee 1]
we declined to exercise original jurisdiction because the dispute was not
between two States, and Illinois had available an action in federal district
court. The Court reasoned that federal law applied to the dispute...
concerning pollution of interstate waters [and that] Illinois could [there-
fore] appeal to federal common law to abate a public nuisance in inter-
state or navigable waters.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 309-10. Milwaukee 1I arose from Illinois's action brought in
federal district court.
106 Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 103 (citing Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457).
107 Id. at 103-04.
108 Id. at 101-02.
109 Id. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963)).
110 Id. at 107.
In Milwaukee II the Court again faced the nuisance issue but found a statutory pre-
emption of federal common law. In the nine year interval between Milwaukee I and Mil-
waukee II, Congress passed the FWPCA Amendments of 1972, Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)), which established a permit system regulating discharges
of pollutants into national waters. In holding that the amendments had preempted fed-
eral common law, the Court relied on Congress's view of the amendments as "total[ly]
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common law to a controversy that exposed a gap in a federal regula-
tory scheme and implicated a strong federal policy.
The Court's filling of statutory gaps by generating federal com-
mon law in Milwaukee I supports the creation of a federal common
law right of contribution under CERCLA's liability provisions.
First, significant gaps exist in the provisions of CERCLA's liability
scheme. With the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)" ' Congress first attempted to combat the hazardous waste
disposal problem by authorizing the EPA to regulate generators,
transporters, and disposers of hazardous waste, and to establish fu-
ture standards for chemical waste disposal. 112 Although prospec-
tively comprehensive, RCRA failed to address past disposal
operations and to provide for cleanup of present health-threatening
waste sites. 113 Responding to RCRA's deficiencies, CERCLA ad-
dresses the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites.1 4 CERCLA's
liability scheme, however, fails to specify how to allocate liability
among multiple responsible parties.15 Second, CERCLA cases im-
plicate a strong federal interest. RCRA and CERCLA together
stand for the strong federal policy of abatement of toxic waste
hazards similar to the federal interest in abatement of water pollu-
tion that the Milwaukee I Court held sufficient to generate a federal
common law of nuisance. 116
restructuring" and "complete[ly] rewriting" existing water pollution legislation. 451
U.S. at 317. The Court stated Congress had "occupied the field through the establish-
ment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative
agency." Id. The Court also narrowly read the Act's savings clauses and concluded that
these clauses did not preserve the federal common law remedy recognized in Milwaukee
I. Id. at 327-29.
111 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). For a detailed discussion of RCRA's regulatory
framework, see Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation
in Wisconsin, 66 MAR. L. REV. 223, 225-42 (1983).
112 See Remarks of Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural
Resources Division, before the American Bar Association Annual Meeting at 3 (Aug. 9,
1982) ("RCRA's primary thrust is prospective regulation of existing sites.").
113 See 126 CONG. REC. H26,359 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep.
Brown); see also infra note 114 (discussing prospectivity of RCRA's regulations).
114 Because RCRA regulates primarily prospective hazardous waste disposal, the
problem of releases from inactive or abandoned hazardous waste sites remained unad-
dressed. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), the court stated that "[a]pparently, Congress' major purpose in
passing RCRA was to control the manner of disposing of hazardous wastes as opposed
to cleaning up the results of past disposal." Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at
834. In CERCLA Congress addressed the past disposal site problem by providing for
cleanup, liability, and compensation with regard to releases of hazardous wastes at inac-
tive disposal sites. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980); 126 CONG.
REC. H9459-60 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980).
115 See supra text preceding note 12.
116 In Milwaukee I the Court concluded that federal water pollution statutes and
aquatic life protection statutes represent a strong federal policy of abatement of water
pollution. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 101-02. The threat of hazardous waste pollution is
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The existence of the gap in CERCLA's liability scheme and the
presence of a strong federal interest give federal courts a sufficient
basis to fashion a federal common law of contribution. Most courts
have applied joint and several liability to CERCLA cases.1 17 Filling
the liability allocation gap with contribution thus makes sense be-
cause joint and several liability and contribution are companion
rights."t 8 Indeed, fairness dictates that when a court holds parties
jointly and severally liable for a hazardous waste release, one party
should not bear the entire burden of the judgment while the other
parties escape liability.119
B. Congressional Authorization
A second basis for federal courts to fashion a federal common
law rule of contribution under CERCLA is congressional authoriza-
tion.' 20 Recently, in Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc. 121 the Federal District
Court for Colorado held that CERCLA's legislative history revealed
congressional intent to empower federal courts to develop a federal
common law contribution rule.122 After examining the congres-
no less serious than the threat of water pollution. Moreover, as with water pollution,
Congress has responded to hazardous waste pollution with regulatory statutes (RCRA
and CERCLA) indicating a strong federal policy of abatement. To illustrate the magni-
tude of the problem, the United States produces more than 57 million metric tons of
hazardous waste annually, 90%o of which is improperly disposed of. See S. REP. No. 848,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
117 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
118 The Senate bill that ultimately became CERCLA, S. 1480, provided forjoint and
several liability and contribution. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. When Con-
gress deleted the joint and several liability provision, it simultaneously deleted the con-
tribution provision. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing deletion); see
also 126 CONG. REC. 30,935-36 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (same); 126 CONG.
REC. 30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph) (same).
119 The majority of states and the Restatement (Second) of Torts allow parties held
jointly and severally liable to seek contribution. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87 n.17.
See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Restatement's joint and several
liability and contribution rules).
120 See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1522-23 (1969); see also
supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Lincoln
Mills that by its jurisdictional grant in Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Con-
gress authorized federal courts to develop substantive law).
121 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D.C. Colo. 1985).
122 Id. at 1489-90.
In ASARCO, Colorado brought an action to recover response costs and damages
under CERCLA § 107 against three defendants, ASARCO, Inc., Resurrection Mining
Co., and Res-ASARCO Joint Venture. Id. at 1485. The three defendants filed third-
party complaints seeking contribution from 15 other responsible parties, allegedly co-
owners of the hazardous release site. Id. The court denied Colorado's motion to dis-
miss the third party complaint, id. at 1493, and held that the congressional commenta-
ries of Senator Randolph and Representative Florio evidenced congressional
authorization for the development of a federal common law of contribution. Id. at 1489.
The court adopted as federal common law the contribution rule of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, which allows for contribution amongjointly and severally liable tortfeasors
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sional commentaries of Senator Randolph and Representative
Florio, 23 the court concluded that contribution is a liability issue
unaddressed by CERCLA which courts should resolve by applying
common law principles.' 24 Although the result in ASARCO is cor-
rect, the court's analysis is incomplete. The ASARCO court failed to
discuss certain factors considered by the Supreme Court in Texas In-
dustries as relevant to determining whether congressional authoriza-
tion exists.
The Court in Texas Industries'25 discussed three factors relevant
to determining whether Congress intended to authorize courts to
formulate a common law right of contribution: the language of the
statute, its legislative history, and the overall regulatory scheme.
These three factors are the same criteria the Court used to discern
an implied statutory right of contribution. 26 Although the factors
are the same, the focus of the inquiry is different. In a congressional
authorization analysis, courts inquire whether the factors indicate
that Congress authorized federal courts to develop common law.' 27
In an implication analysis, courts ask whether the factors show that
Congress impliedly created a statutory right.' 28
A comparison of CERCLA with the Sherman Act will illustrate
the focus of the congressional authorization analysis. The Court in
Texas Industries applied the three authorization factors to a Sherman
Act case and found no indication that Congress authorized federal
courts to create a right of contribution. As with CERCLA, the Sher-
man Act's statutory language provided no support for a congres-
sional intent to empower courts to formulate a contribution rule
because it contained no reference to contribution. The Court deter-
mined that the Sherman Act's legislative history, although indicating
a congressional intent to give courts power to define substantive vi-
olations, failed to indicate an intent to empower courts to formulate
remedies or the kind of relief sought through contribution.129 The
Court also concluded that the scope and detail of the antitrust statu-
and conforms with the CERCLA goal of expeditious hazardous waste site cleanup. Id. at
1490-91.
123 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
124 608 F. Supp. at 1489.
125 451 U.S. at 645 (analyzing three factors, but fixing no relative weight to any).
126 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
127 451 U.S. at 645.
128 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
129 451 U.S. at 643-44. The Court distinguished the lawmaking powers conferred in
defining violations and the ability to fashion relief. Id. at 644. The Court also pointed
out that when the Sherman Act was adopted, the common law did not provide a right of
contribution among tortfeasors and that this omission raised a "permissible, though not
mandatory, inference. . . that Congress relied on court's continuing to apply principles
in effect at the time of enactment." Id. at n.17.
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tory scheme and its existence for ninety years without a contribution
amendment indicated that Congress did not authorize courts to for-
mulate a right of contribution. 130
CERCLA's legislative history differs from that of the Sherman
Act and indicates that Congress authorized federal courts to create a
common law right of contribution under CERCLA. First, CER-
CLA's legislative history expressly indicates that common law prin-
ciples are to determine "issues of liability not resolved by [the]
act."' 3' Thus, in contrast to the deliberations preceding the Sher-
man Act, CERCLA's legislative history indicates an intent to give
courts the power to formulate rules allocating liability, including
rules of contribution and joint and several liability. Furthermore,
because thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia allowed con-
tribution among tortfeasors at the time of CERCLA's enactment,13 2
the inference that Congress could not have contemplated a contri-
bution rule when it referred to common law principles of liability
does not arise as it did with the Sherman Act.'3 3 Finally, unlike the
legislative history of the antitrust laws, which does not mention con-
tribution, 3 4 CERCLA's legislative history shows that the drafters
consistently treated contribution as a companion right to joint and
several liability.135 When Congress simultaneously deleted joint
and several liability and contribution, it explicitly suggested that
courts should determine both issues of liability through evolving
common law principles.
In addition, differences between the statutory scheme of CER-
CLA and the Sherman Act support the argument that Congress em-
powered courts to fashion a federal common law rule of
contribution under CERCLA. First, unlike the antitrust laws, CER-
CLA is a remedial rather than punitive legislative scheme.' 3 6 CER-
130 Id. at 645. The Court invoked the presumption that Congress deliberately omits
a remedy from a statute "when [it] has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme in-
cluding an integrated system of procedures for enforcement." Id.
131 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
132 Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87 n.17.
133 See supra note 129.
134 Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 630.
135 See supra notes 18-20, 118 and accompanying text.
136 CERCLA enforcement actions under § 107 impose liability for costs of cleanup
and for damages to natural resources. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In addition, the Act sets
liability limits for responsible parties, unless a release resulted from wilful misconduct,
in which case courts may impose full costs. Id. § 9607(c). Although these provisions
indicate that liability under CERCLA primarily seeks to compensate injured parties, the
Act allows assessment of punitive damages if responsible parties fail to comply with or-
ders (under § 9604 or § 9606) to clean up or take remedial action. Id. § 9607(c)(3).
Note, however, that these punitive measures do not apply immediately upon a violation
of the statute (as with the treble damages provision of Sherman Act), but only after
responsible parties refuse to comply with administrative orders. Therefore, CERCLA
serves a predominantly remedial, rather than punitive, legislative purpose.
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CLA imposes strict liability on nonculpable, nonnegligent' 37 parties
who have a statutorily-imposed responsibility to clean up waste
sites. In contrast, the antitrust laws impose fault-based liability; de-
fendant wrongdoers seek contribution to mitigate the consequences
of their wrongdoing. 138 Because CERCLA is remedial in nature,139
contribution would not mitigate the punishment of wrongdoers.' 40
In addition, contribution follows from the statute's overall remedial
purpose, expediting cleanup by distributing liability among all re-
sponsible parties.
Second, the gaps in CERCLA's liability scheme support the
conclusion that Congress authorized courts to fashion liability rules,
including a contribution rule. Because CERCLA's statutory scheme
contains gaps in its liability provisions, the Texas Industries presump-
tion that Congress has deliberately omitted a remedy when it has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme does not apply. 141 The
combination of an incomplete statutory scheme with a legislative
history indicating congressional intent that federal courts use com-
mon law to fill the gaps provides a strong basis for inferring con-
gressional authorization for the courts to fashion a common law rule
of contribution.
CONCLUSION
The absence of an express contribution provision in CERCLA
should not preclude federal courts from fashioning a common law
contribution rule for defendants held jointly and severally liable.
Without a CERCLA contribution rule, responsible parties not sued
by the government would escape liability, and the burden of cleanup
costs would fall on only some responsible parties. Federal courts
should base a creation of a common law right of contribution among
CERCLA defendants on the competence of federal courts to fill the
137 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The most common nonculpable re-
sponsible party in a CERCLA suit is a nonnegligent (i.e., someone not shown to be
negligent) offsite generator. This term refers to a waste generator who arranged to have
hazardous substances disposed of at sites from which there later were releases or
threatened releases. Comment, supra note 9, at 10,226.
138 Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 635.
139 CERCLA does not punish for a defendant's initial violation, but the act does
provide punitive measures for failure to comply with cleanup/remedial action orders.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
140 451 U.S. at 639. The Court explained that contribution might not comport with
a punitive purpose. "The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past,
and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers...
[and indicates] that Congress was [not] concerned with softening the blow on joint
wrongdoers." Id. With a primarily remedial, compensatory statute such as CERCLA,
Congress would remain less concerned that contribution ameliorated the liability of re-
sponsible parties. See supra note 61.
141 451 U.S. at 645. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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gaps in CERCLA with federal common law. The presence of an in-
complete statutory scheme and a strong federal interest in abating
hazardous waste spills buttress the argument for gap filling by fed-
eral courts. Courts may also find a separate ground for fashioning
federal common law in CERCLA's legislative history and statutory
scheme which suggest that Congress authorized federal courts to fill
the statute's liability gaps with common law principles.
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